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in the Endgame? 
Robert P.  Flood and Peter M. Garber 
Recent analyses of the transition to European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) have emphasized technical problems in the conversion ra- 
tios of  currencies into the euro at the start of Stage 111. Restrictions on 
bilateral conversion rates imply that they must be the same as market bilat- 
eral rates at the end of  Stage 11. From this fact has come a conclusion 
that exchange markets may generate volatility, speculative attacks, or even 
indeterminacy of exchange rates on the last day of Stage 11. We  show in 
this paper that concern over these technical issues per se, as an additional 
source of exchange market volatility, is a red herring: euro payment institu- 
tions that begin operating at the outset of Stage I11 make it easy for “in” 
central banks to establish any desired bilateral conversion ratios for their 
currencies. As long as Stage I11 itself is viable at the outset-a  premise of 
the discussion-“in”  central banks are formidably armed to impose de- 
sired conversion ratios within the restrictions. All discussion of the conver- 
sion problem presumes that Stage I11 will be viable. Otherwise, the notion 
that exchange rates are locked on 1 January 1999 is not valid. We also will 
presume that the irrevocable fixed rates will not be revoked on 1 January 
1999 (or more accurately by  the time the payments systems close on 4 
January, the first business day of the year) and that the institutions will 
work as designed at the start of Stage 111. 
Moreover, the exchange rate models of monetary policy used to derive 
implications of  increased volatility are quite narrow. Models that more 
accurately capture central bank operating policy in practice do not gener- 
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ate problems with controlling exchange rate volatility in the transition to 
Stage 111, as we show in section 5.3. 
5.1  The Endgame Problem 
The endgame of  Stage I1 of the EMU is  a period of great potential 
exchange rate instability. Uncertainty about final bilateral conversion fac- 
tors of “in” country currencies and the market value of the euro and the 
ECU at the end of Stage I1 creates a pressure cooker for speculation after 
the “in” countries emerge. Various schemes for monetary cooperation and 
exchange rate policies have been proposed, ranging from tight bands, to 
progressively narrowing bands, to early operations of the European Cen- 
tral Bank (ECB) to enforce monetary cooperation.‘ 
Atop this general speculative environment, Obstfeld (1997a, 1997b), De 
Grauwe (1997), and De Grauwe and Spaventa (1997), among others, have 
emphasized a technical feature of the transition to Stage I11 that adds to 
the endgame instabilities. The Maastricht treaty requires that the conver- 
sion rates of individual “in” currencies into the euro announced on 1 Janu- 
ary 1997 do not, of themselves, cause a jump in the ECU from its market 
value on 31 December 1998. The Madrid Council decision requires that 
on 1 January 1999, the conversion rates of the “in” currencies into the euro 
be such that one euro equals one ECU. Obstfeld (1997a, 1997b) shows that 
either of  these requirements implies that the irrevocable bilateral conver- 
sion rates between “in” country currencies announced on 1 January 1999 
must equal the market bilateral exchange rates at the close of business on 
31 December 1998. 
From this fact of arithmetic, Obstfeld (1997a) and De Grauwe (1997) 
infer additional problems for the transition. First, transient disturbances 
that are still contained in market exchange rates on 31 December 1998 will 
be locked forever in the bilateral conversion rates when the market rates 
are ratified by Stage I11 policy on 1 January 1999. Even a one-day transi- 
tory shock on 31 December 1998 will  be permanently impounded in bi- 
lateral conversion rates,  as  stabilizing speculation  will  not  soften  the 
disturbance’s permanent impact. Indeed, any arbitrary exchange rates es- 
tablished by  the markets will  be made permanent, and this can generate 
tremendous volatility on the last day of Stage II.2 
A facile answer to this endgame volatility is  to manage the exchange 
1. See Obstfeld (1997a) for a list of these proposals. 
2. There is a difference of opinion between Obstfeld and De Grauwe over whether this 
volatility constitutes an indeterminacy problem among multiple equilibria. Obstfeld claims 
that there is an “especially severe risk on Dec 31  of an attack” since “speculators know that 
bilateral exchange rates must be maintained in Stage 3.” The “in” central banks may have to 
intervene in large amounts, but if their willpower fails there is a chance for a large specula- 
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rate leading into 31  December 1997 with a hard peg at some mutually 
agreed set of bilateral rates by close of business. Indeed, to head off specu- 
lation about the bilateral conversion rates, the potential members of the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) have agreed that the intended 
bilateral rates will be announced simultaneously with the announcement 
of the “in” countries in May 1998. Such pegs, however, are subject to at- 
tack if speculators doubt that “in” central banks will conduct a near-in de- 
fense without limit. The attack may occur on or before 31 December 1997. 
Moreover, there is a moral hazard problem: a central bank may gain com- 
petitive advantage from a last-minute depreciation of its currency and re- 
duce the real value of its debt. This may undermine the monetary coopera- 
tion needed to sustain preprogrammed bilateral exchange rates. 
Taken together, the conversion constraints imposed by Maastricht and 
Madrid add to the potential volatility already inherent in exchange mar- 
kets between the selection time of EMU members and the start of Stage 
111. Various proposals have aimed at controlling the problems imposed by 
these constraints. Obstfeld (1997a) states that it is rash to assume that 
monetary coordination will begin among independent central banks be- 
fore the ECB is given control; he proposes a start-up in the ECBS powers 
of central monetary control prior to the start of Stage III.3 
5.2  The Stage I11 Payments System Obviates the Conversion Problem 
In the context of  the 31  December 1998 exchange market, Obstfeld’s 
(1997a) proposal to move the operations of the ESCB forward into Stage 
I1 already has implicitly been implemented in one vital a~pect.~  The TAR- 
GET payments system will  begin operation on 4 January 1999, the first 
business day of Stage 111.  Payments among “in” countries will  be made 
through the operating procedures of  TARGET. Such payments include 
those in settlement of  foreign exchange transactions made two business 
days earlier and forward exchange transactions  with a 4 January  1999 
value date. Thus any exchange market intervention by an “in” country on 
31 December 1998 or, indeed, on 30 December 1998 to establish agreed 
bilateral exchange rates will  be  settled through TARGET. We  will  show 
3. This problem was at least partly addressed by  the agreement to announce bilateral 
conversion rates in May 1998. 
4.  In an extensive update of his original paper, Obstfeld (1997b) incorporates the two basic 
points of an early draft of our current paper: (1) the details of TARGET system operations 
are a key element in making credible unlimited intervention in support of the selected bilat- 
eral exchange rates prior to 1 January 1999, and (2) forward intervention with maturity after 
1 January 1999 by  “in” central banks can be used in unlimited amounts to stabilize bilateral 
rates at desired levels by  “in” central banks between May  1998 and 31 January  1999. By 
continuing to center his paper around the technical requirement of maintaining the bilateral 
exchange rate between 31 December 1998 and 1 January 1999, however, he ignores the impli- 
cation of points 1 and 2: the endgame bilateral conversion restrictions are an irrelevant dis- 
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that the unlimited inter-central-bank credit facilities of TARGET in fact 
realize the ability of a central bank to intervene without limit on 31 De- 
cember and constitutes a de facto reach-back into Stage I1 of the opera- 
tions of the ESCB. Thus the conversion restrictions add no operational 
problem to the start-up of Stage 111 because “in” central banks can un- 
questionably establish whatever exchange rates they agree upon on 31 De- 
cember. Focusing on these technical start-up conditions throws an irrele- 
vancy into the discussion. 
EMU is intended to remove the costs that are perceived from currency 
transactions between members of the European Union and to create a 
currency area on a scale that can generate liquidity comparable to that in 
the U.S.  dollar zone. Equally important, EMU, once completed, is ex- 
pected to eliminate the possibility of a speculative attack of the sort that 
crippled the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). 
At the start of Stage 111  on 1 January  1999, the major currencies of 
those countries that join will  have “irrevocably” locked exchange rates. 
National currencies will continue to exist until 2002, and commercial bank 
deposits can still be denominated in national currencies, although euro- 
denominated accounts will also be available. By 2002, the individual cur- 
rencies-French  francs, deutsche marks, and so forth-will  disappear and 
be replaced by  a circulating paper euro. In addition, two key institutions 
will  become operational at the start of Stage 111-the  European System 
of Central Banks led by  the European Central Bank and TARGET, the 
large-value cross-border euro electronic payments system. 
5.2.1 
The ESCB will be a combination of the national central banks, such as 
the Banque de France and the Bundesbank, under the coordination of the 
ECB, but key central banking functions and operations will be performed 
by the still-existing national central banks.5 Monetary policy will be con- 
trolled by the ECB-that  is, the setting of reserve requirements, discount 
rates, and foreign exchange policy; open market intervention; and so on. 
The ECB will have its own balance sheet and capital. 
Nevertheless, the national central banks will  retain their identities. In 
particular, each national central bank will operate its own national large- 
value payments system and have its own balance sheet and capital. The 
profits (and losses) on monetary operations of the ECSB will be distrib- 
uted to the national central banks in proportion to their shareholdings in 
the ECB. In turn, national central banks can pass these profits through to 
their respective national governments as in current practice. 
The Structure of the European System of Central Banks 
5. The discussion in this subsection and the next on TARGET is taken from Garber (1998). Is Launching the Euro Unstable in the Endgame?  167 
5.2.2  Some Operational Details of TARGET 
When it goes on line at the start of Stage 111, the TARGET payments 
system will provide the interface between national payments systems and 
will not replace them.6 Euro payments originating in one country will be 
delivered one for one nearly instantly  as euros in another country. The 
cross-border euro payment can then emerge as a commercial bank deposit 
denominated either in euros or, after fixed rate conversion, in the national 
currency. An understanding of some operational rules of TARGET is im- 
portant: individual national central banks strictly adhering to them will 
freely provide unlimited credit to each other so that speculators will have 
no chance to profit by  attacking and breaking the Stage I11 locked ex- 
change rates.’ 
TARGET will effect large-value payments in the euro, the new common 
currency. TARGET is designed, according to the current risk control prac- 
tice of most industrial country central banks, as a real-time gross settle- 
ment (RTGS) system. In such a system, final settlement of a payment is 
made almost simultaneously with the transmission of a payment message 
during the day. Therefore, the sender of  the payment must have central 
bank money available at the time that the payment order is sent-other- 
wise, the payment is blocked. 
Standard European RTGS systems allow a bank to overdraw its central 
bank account to make payments during the day provided that the over- 
drafts are collateralized by acceptable paper such as the securities of the 
national government. 
The TARGET system will work as follows. As a first example, suppose 
that a payment is made in euros or French francs from one commercial 
bank to another in France. Both banks will have accounts at the Banque 
de France and will transmit payments across the national system. Pay- 
ments will be settled by instantaneously transferring funds across bank de- 
posit accounts at the Banque de France. 
Second, suppose that a euro payment is made from a bank in France 
to a bank in Germany. The French bank will  send a payment message 
over the French national system. The payment order will be channeled 
automatically through Banque de France software that will subtract the 
amount from the Banque de France account of the French bank and pro- 
cess the payment order onward through the TARGET system to the Bun- 
desbank. In turn, on receiving confirmation that euro funds are available 
6. TARGET stands for  Trans-European Automated  Real-Time Gross Settlement  Ex- 
press Transfer. 
7. For the purposes of this paper we  will make the standard assumption used by mainly 
European researchers on the EMU that Stage 111 is unassailable. Garber (1998) explores the 
issue of how the TARGET system might transmit and exacerbate a Stage I11 crisis. 168  Robert P.  Flood and Peter M. Garber 
in the Banque de France account of the sending bank, the Bundesbank 
will increment the account of the German bank one to one with euros. 
Thus a euro payment will be settled almost instantaneously across bor- 
ders. If in Stage I11 the cross-border payment from the French bank is de- 
nominated in deutsche marks, it will still be transmitted across the books 
of the central banks as euros but it will  be credited as a deutsche mark 
deposit by the German bank on receipt. Such payments from the internal 
currency of one country to that of another now generally require the stan- 
dard two-day wait in the exchange market through the use of two uncon- 
nected, parallel national payment systems. 
Accounts can balance after this cross-border transaction because credit 
has been given by the Bundesbank to the Banque de France in settling the 
payment. The funds made available to the receiving bank in Germany are 
instantaneous  and irrevocable; the  funds  that  are  deducted  from  the 
French bank are funds in  an account at the Banque de France; so the 
Banque de France has incurred a “due to” to the Bundesbank. This will 
be accounted by  incrementing the Bundesbank’s bilateral correspondent 
(or  interlinking)  account  at  the  Banque  de  France  and  reducing  the 
Banque de France’s correspondent  account  at the Bundesbank  by  the 
same amount. 
In the example in table 5.1, Paribas makes a payment of 100 euros (or 
the equivalent amount of deutsche marks) to Deutschebank. This alters 
the Banque de France and Bundesbank balance sheets as shown between 
panels A and B. Commercial bank deposits fall by 100 euros at the Banque 
de France and rise by 100 euros at the Bundesbank. The overall monetary 
base in euros is unchanged, but part of it has migrated to Germany. This 
is accomplished instantly through an automatic credit from the Bundes- 
bank to the Banque de France of 100 euros.* 
In this regard, TARGET operation is not remarkable and differs little 
from, for example, the U.S. Federal Reserve’s Fedwire system (based on 
Summers 1994). In the Federal Reserve system, daily imbalances between 
district  Federal Reserve banks-that  is,  imbalances that arise when in- 
terbank  payments cross district  lines-are  cleared by  incrementing the 
claims of district Feds with net payment inflows against the Interdistrict 
Settlement Account. Claims against this account by district Feds with net 
payment  outflows are  reduced.  This  process  is  repeated  on each  suc- 
ceeding business day. The cumulated claims against or obligations to the 
Interdistrict Settlement Account are settled once per year in April with 
the redistribution  of  gold  certificates from  district  Feds with  negative 
8. The negative balance in the Banque de France’s interlinking account at the Bundesbank 
is in accord with the European Monetary Institute’s (1997) description of TARGET account- 
ing. Peter Kenen has pointed out that this document is erroneous and that the item should 
appear as a “due from” Banque de France in the Bundesbank’s asset column (see Kenen’s 
comment on this chapter). Table 5.1  Cross-Border Payment on  TARGET 
Banque de France  Bundesbank 
Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities  Assets 
A. Initial Central Bank Balance Sheets (euros) 
French government securities  400  0  Due to Bundesbank  Loans to German banks  400  0  Due to Banque de France 
400  French bank deposits  400  German bank deposits 
B. Central Bank Balance Sheets ajier Paribas Pays I00  Euros to Deutschebank 
French government securities  400  100  Due to Bundesbank  Loans to German banks  400  -  100  Due to Banque de France 
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cumulated net payment positions to those with positive positions. Settle- 
ment in the Federal Reserve system does not require the use of accounts 
in a third-party bank. Specifically, the Board of Governors in Washington 
is not a bank in itself but a regulatory body of each of the district Federal 
Reserve banks. Nevertheless, the Interdistrict Settlement Account is a mul- 
tilateral-not  a bilateral-account;  claims against it are claims against 
the system. 
If the individual national central banks freely provide credit to other 
national central banks, TARGET will  function as planned  and serve as 
the heartbeat of the unified currency. In this scenario, speculators will have 
no chance to profit by  attacking the locked exchange rates of the sys- 
tem in the face of unlimited inter-central-bank credit. This differs from 
the  current  ERM, in  which  unlimited  inter-central-bank  credit  is  not 
available. 
5.2.3  A Decembrist Attack 
Let  us  imagine that  the “in” central  banks attempt to establish an 
agreed vector of bilateral exchange rates on 31 December but that specu- 
lators launch an attack anyway. This may be a self-fulfilling crisis or the 
result of a large, though transitory shock on 31 December. Let us suppose 
that the weak currency is the French franc, and the strong currency is the 
deutsche mark. Speculators want to short deposits in France denominated 
in French francs and acquire deposits in Germany denominated in marks. 
The agreed bilateral rates may be defended in several ways. 
1. The Banque de France in the Breach. The Banque de France may inter- 
vene in the spot market, selling marks for francs to whatever extent the 
speculators want. It does not raise interest rates or take other action. In 
two business days-on  5 January  1999-the  Banque de France sends a 
payment order through the TARGET system to the Bundesbank to deliver 
deutsche marks to the speculators’ mark-denominated bank accounts in 
Frankfurt. It incurs a euro-denominated liability to the Bundesbank, ac- 
counted for by  adding to the Bundesbank’s interlinking  correspondent 
account at the Banque de France. The Bundesbank will  subtract a like 
amount from the Banque de France’s correspondent account at the Bun- 
desbank. The Bundesbank will have given credit, if necessary, in unlimited 
amounts to the Banque de France. The speculators will  have to deliver 
French francs to the Banque de France on the same day. Where will this 
huge amount of francs come from? The speculators have the marks just 
deposited  by  the  Bundesbank  in  their  Frankfurt  commercial  bank 
deutsche mark accounts, so they order franc payments to the Banque de 
9. For a discussion of the accounting operations involved in a defense of ERM bands 
through the Very Short Term Financing Facility, see Garber (1998). Is Launching the Euro Unstable in the Endgame?  171 
France in Paris. In turn, these payments will be processed over TARGET 
and exactly cancel the previous payments from the Banque de France. 
There is no net monetary impact from these transactions. 
If we  believe that the institutions of Stage I11  operate properly, as we 
must if we premise the problem on the viability of the conversion exchange 
rates at the start of Stage 111, then the “in” central banks can effortlessly 
establish whatever bilateral exchange rates they want on 31 December or 
30 December. 
Extending the argument backward, intervention need not occur only in 
the spot markets. Prior to 30 December, “in” central banks can intervene 
in the franc-mark forward markets with a value date on 4 January 1999 to 
establish the bilateral exchange rates they may want. Again, the operation 
of TARGET implicitly feeds credit backward in time to whatever moment 
the central banks wish to begin their interventions to establish the desired 
conversion rates. 
2. Moral Hazard and a Stalwart Bundesbank. Suppose that the Banque de 
France suffers from a bout of moral hazard and finds a reason not to 
intervene against the attack on 31 December. If it is still interested in the 
EMU, the Bundesbank can then pick up the burden through its own inter- 
vention. Again, the payment orders cancel on 5 January 1999, although 
they begin in the opposite direction. 
3. Does Any Central Bank Out There Want the EMU? Suppose that, luke- 
warm  about making the good  faith effort to get  to EMU, neither  the 
Banque de France nor the Bundesbank intervenes when faced with the 31 
December attack. The National Bank of Belgium, however, is enthusiastic 
about EMU, so it undertakes the massive intervention-selling  deutsche 
marks for French francs in Stage 11-required  to maintain the desired 
bilateral rates. Where does it get the resources to do this? Again, through 
TARGET. 
Unless an ,‘in” central bank actively undercuts the agreed bilateral ex- 
change rates, even the smallest “in” central bank is armed through TAR- 
GET with sufficient credit resources to hold the desired bilateral exchange 
rates together-in  all the “in” currencies-in  the face of a massive specu- 
lative attack.’O It is difficult to imagine such subversion among members 
of the elite club, however, while still believing that Stage I11 will proceed 
as planned, which is the premise of the various analyses of the Stage I1 
conversion and volatility problem. 
10. The undercutting might take the form of an opposite intervention. Also, an “in” coun- 
try that drops out of the EMU before Stage 111 certainly breaks the supposed provision of 
unlimited credit, but this violates our working assumption of a successful Stage 111. 172  Robert l?  Flood and Peter M. Garber 
5.3  Modeling the Endgame Problem 
Although TARGET operations make unassailable the fixing of bilateral 
exchange rates on 31 December 1998, it is useful to examine the generality 
of the modeling framework used to infer the added volatility problems in 
the Stage 11-Stage  I11 conversion restrictions. Obstfeld (1997a) concludes 
that the future fixing of exchange rates in Stage 111 can-because  of the 
requirement to carry over bilateral exchange rates from the end of Stage 
I1 into Stage 111-destabilize  the exchange rate in the present. Obstfeld’s 
conclusions arise from a special model. While we  agree with the theoreti- 
cal results in the context of his model, we  find some aspects of the model 
at odds with standard central bank operating procedures. In particular, in 
Obstfeld’s model, monetary authorities at first apparently set a monetary 
aggregate without regard to short-term interest rates. Then, when the date 
for exchange rate fixing arrives, they abandon their monetary aggregates 
and set the exchange rate; and by  implication, they also set short-term 
interest rates. 
Contrary to this perspective, central banks in practice implement mone- 
tary policy in a very different manner. Monetary authorities implement 
policy by setting short-term interest rates, though as the date for Stage I11 
approaches, they  must  set them with  increasing attention to exchange 
rates. In the model that we  will  lay out, there is no increase in exchange 
rate volatility in  the transition.  Indeed, with interest rate targeting, ex- 
change rate volatility converges to zero on the verge  of  the switch time 
between Stage I1 and Stage 111.  We  argue further that  this alternative 
model better matches important institutional aspects of the money supply 
process and foreign exchange market. 
We will first lay out Obstfeld’s model and derive his conclusions about 
volatility. Then we will twist the model in a direction appropriate for short- 
term analysis. Finally, we will discuss some technical aspects of the money 
supply process in European countries during the transition that point in 
the direction of our modeling strategy rather than that adopted by  Obst- 
feld . 
5.3.1 
equations determining the equilibrium exchange rate are 
Obstfeld’s Model and His Warning 
Obstfeld (1997a) adopts a flexible price model of exchange rates. The 
(2) 
(3)  N,  =  +  E,, 
i, - i,*  =  E,S,+, - S,, Is Launching the Euro Unstable in the Endgame?  173 
where N is the log of market fundamentals, S is the log of the exchange 
rate quoted as the domestic currency price of  foreign exchange, i is the 
short-term domestic currency interest rate, and i* is the short-term foreign 
currency interest rate. Equation (1) is an asset market equilibrium condi- 
tion that may  be derived, for example, from the money market. In this 
view, N implicitly contains variables that are important in the short-term 
money market: the quantity of money and other price and money demand 
effects such as the real exchange rate, real income, or disturbances  to 
money demand. Equation (2) is the statement of uncovered interest rate 
parity. It sets the interest differential equal to the rationally expected rate 
of exchange rate change. Equation (3) is a simple law of motion for ex- 
change market fundamentals.  is a constant and E, is a mean-zero, serially 
uncorrelated disturbance term. The law of motion of the exchange rate is 
a special case of the one that Obstfeld uses, chosen both to put his warning 
in its sharpest relief and to simplify the algebra. 
According to this model, if  the exchange rate were  freely flexible it 
would follow 
(4) 
El  S,=N+- 
I+  a' 
- 
Setting the variance of E at unity, exchange rate variance is 
V(S)  =  <I 
(1 +  a)2 
Now turn to the days surrounding exchange rate fixing. Suppose that 
date t is the last day of floating and date t + 1 is the first day of the fixed 
rate era. This is a terminal condition on the foregoing model, and Obstfeld 
argues (correctly) that if  the exchange rate is to be fixed precisely as pro- 
posed, at opening on Monday morning it will have to be pegged at the 
value inherited from closing the previous Friday. Hence, if day t is the day 
prior to fixing, 
E,S,+, - S,  =  0. 
Using this condition in equation (2) and then substituting into equation 
(1) we derive 
- 
S,  =  N, =  N  +  E,. 
The effect of promising to fix the exchange rate has removed completely 
the expected exchange rate change from the asset market on the day before 
fixing. Movements in N, are reflected in identical movements of the ex- 
change rate S,. The coefficient on  E, jumps from  1/(1 + a)  in equation 
(4),  a number between zero and unity, to exactly unity. The exchange rate 174  Robert P. Flood and Peter M. Garber 
variance must also jump from (1/(1 + a))’ < 1 to unity. In other words, 
the promise to fix the exchange rate at time  t  + 1 raises the short-run 
exchange rate variance at time t. As Obstfeld demonstrates, the promise 
to fix has similar, but slightly muted, effects on exchange rate variance on 
all the days prior to the Stage I11 fixing.” 
Obstfeld’s logic, discussion, and derivation follow relentlessly once one 
has bought into the model embodied in equations (l), (2),  and (3). From 
our perspective, however, it is plain that  a different set of  assumptions 
better describes one crucial aspect of the working of the foreign exchange 
market. 
5.3.2  Modeling Monetary Policy 
We  agree that the empirical performance of all models of the foreign 
exchange market based on high-frequency data (observations of one year 
or less) has been  an absolute disaster. These models usually include a 
market-clearing condition like equation (l), an uncovered interest parity 
condition, equation (2),  and a data-appropriate forcing process for funda- 
mentals like equation (3).  While equations (1) and (2) do not hold up well 
in data, they allow Obstfeld to make his argument in a clean and simple 
way, and that argument carries over to more complicated and possibly more 
realistic versions of equations (1) and (2). We therefore adopt Obstfeld’s 
equations for private behavior, but we part company with his equation (3), 
the time-series model of market fundamentals, which incorporates short- 
run monetary policy. 
Our preferred model is 
(7)  MI - S,  = -a(i, - i,*)  - E,,  a >  0, 
- 
(8)  i, - i,* =  6 +  he,  =  E,S,+l  - S,, 
(9)  M,  =  @ +  $E,. 
In equation (7),  we  refine Obstfeld’s N, fundamentals into the sum of 
the money supply, MI,  and other fundamentals, E,. We  continue to use 
Obstfeld’s notation E, as the source of uncertainty, but we  move it to the 
right-hand side of the money market equilibrium condition to distinguish 
it from MI.  Equation (8) continues to reflect uncovered interest rate parity, 
but  in  addition  the  government  now  sets the  short-term  interest  rate 
differential at i, -  i:  = s + XE,.  In this policy setting, 6 is the average 
interest rate differential and XE,  depicts the sensitivity of interest rate pol- 
icy to current market conditions. Equation (9) expresses the settings for 
monetary policy such that the government can realize its policy target for 
11. See Obstfeld (1997a, app. A, eq. 131)  for details. Is Launching the Euro Unstable in the Endgame?  175 
-  the interest rate differential. In this approach, the time-series process for 
M,, the value of  IJJ,  and  the quantity of money M, are all endogenous to 
the model. 
The policy authority may set 8 and X as desired; but the money supply 
rule (9) must then be tailored  to meet the interest  rate target.’* In  the 
appendix we  solve our model for a floating exchange rate along the lines 
suggested by Canzoneri, Henderson, and Rogoff (1983). That solution is 
S,  =  a6 +  @ - A&,, 
M, =  s +  M,_,, 
IJJ  = -[(I  +  (Y)X +  I], 
where M,-, should be interpreted as a predetermined variable. 
With this interest rate policy, the exchange rate variance is hZ.  The deter- 
ministic portion of the money supply (differential) is explosive to the ex- 
tent that 8 is different from zero. 
With this model of operational monetary policy in mind, let us move to 
31 December 1998, before the Stage 111, immutable, exchange rate fixing. 
As Obstfeld argues, on 3 1 December interest rates must converge. In order 
-  to keep E,S,+, = S, for all future dates t  + i, the government must set 
6 = 0 and A  = 0. This, of course, makes the 31 December exchange rate 
nonstochastic  and  equal  to M,, the deterministic  portion  of  the money 
supply. 
5.4  Conclusion 
There are many reasons to worry about the approaching EMU. It may 
collapse in Stage 111. It may generate an attack on the ERM in Stage 11. 
It may succeed and exacerbate asynchronous cyclical pressures. That these 
instabilities may occur, however, has little to do with the minor technical 
issue of the equality of bilateral exchange rates across the interface days 
between Stage I1 and Stage 111. The operational nature of the TARGET 
payments  system and the  use  of  forward  market  interventions or the 
equivalent interventions to fix  interest rates are sufficient to bridge the 
bilateral rates across Stage I1 and Stage 111, given the standard assumption 
of a successful Stage 111. The issue of the equality of bilateral conversion 
rates across Stages I1 and I11 is of some technical interest, but by begging 
the question it can only distract attention away from the far more impor- 
tant issues of the survivability of  Stage I11 and, working backward, the 
speculation over such survivability and over the ultimate “in” membership 
that will be ongoing both before and after May 1998. 
12. The values of s and A may be set to minimize a Kydland-Prescott-style loss function 
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Appendix 
To solve models in which the money supply is set to accommodate private 
demand in order to implement an interest  rate target, Canzoneri et al. 
(1983) recommend the following solution technique. 
Step 1. Substitute from the interest rate rule, equation (8), and the required 
money  accommodation,  equation  (9),  into the  equilibrium  condition, 
equation (7), and rearrange to derive 
(‘41)  S,  =  as +  @ + (+  +  aX  +  l)~,. 
Step 2.  Update equation (Al) by  one period and take the expectation as 
of date t,  yielding 
-- 
E,Sl+l  =  016  + 
(Remember that &  is the nonstochastic part of the money supply.) 
Step 3. Subtract equation (Al) from equation (A2) and equate the result 
to the interest rate target, resulting in 
(A31 
Equation  (A3) is  to be  regarded  as an identity, which determines the 
money supply so that the money market is in equilibrium. This requires 
- @ - (+  +  aX  +  l)~,  =  8 +  XE,. 
(A41  +  = -[(I  +  a)X +  11, 
- 
= s +  M,. 
By  direct calculation, substituting the restriction described  in equation 
(A4) into equation (Al) results in equation (lOa), the exchange rate expres- 
sion reported in the main text. 
Canzoneri et al. complete their solution as we do by imposing the initial 
condition that %,,  is predetermined from the prehistory of the model. The 
Canzoneri et al. insight is to preserve the dynamic structure in a Cagan- 
style model of the price level by recognizing that pegging the interest rate 
is equivalent, in that model, to pegging the expected inflation rate. Pegging 
expected inflation, in turn, requires setting the prospective money growth 
rate, taking as predetermined an inherited money stock. Canzoneri et al., 
therefore, propose solving a single dynamic equation in two unknowns by 
imposing an initial condition on money. Sargent and Wallace (1973) in 
other, previous research  had proposed solving an equivalent indetermi- 
nacy problem by  imposing the famous “no bubbles” terminal condition. Is Launching the Euro Unstable in the Endgame?  177 
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Private notes. 
Comment  Peter B. Kenen 
I have no quarrel with the main message of this paper. Central banks due 
to participate in EMU will  have no trouble fixing the bilateral exchange 
rates between their currencies at the close of foreign exchange trading on 
the last day before EMU. They can therefore meet the restrictive condi- 
tions imposed by the Maastricht treaty. The real-time gross settlement sys- 
tem (TARGET) due to come into being when EMU begins will allow them 
to finance unlimited intervention on the day before EMU begins. Flood 
and Garber rightly draw an analogy with the short-term credit arrange- 
ments available under the ERM of the European Monetary System, and 
the analogy can be carried further. The exchange rate regime prevailing in 
the first years of EMU, before the national currencies are replaced com- 
pletely by  the euro, can be viewed  as a new version of the ERM. There 
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will be no exchange rate band; there will be no need to repay reserve credit 
obtained from other central banks; and there will  be no ceiling on the 
volume of credit obtainable from those central banks. (There is no formal 
limit under the ERM, but the Bundesbank reserved the right to impose 
one unilaterally in the so-called Emminger letter.) 
The paper, however, raises two questions: (I) Why should there be any 
doubt about the central banks’ ability to intervene on a scale sufficient to 
meet the requirements of the treaty? (2) Might TARGET itself break down 
because its credit facilities are too liberal? I will take up both questions 
shortly, after raising two technical objections to the Flood-Garber paper. 
It is too kind to the European Monetary Institute (EMI). It is unkind to 
Maurice Obstfeld. 
In descriptions of TARGET published by  the EM1 (e.g., EM1  1997), 
TARGET is described as a network of bilateral correspondent (interlink- 
ing) accounts connecting the participating central banks, and Flood and 
Garber borrow that terminology. But they also borrow an example from 
the EM1 that is inconsistent with it. 
Flood and Garber describe a transfer from a French bank to a German 
bank. It starts when the Banque de France debits the account held by the 
French bank at the Banque de France and ends when the Bundesbank 
credits the account held by the German bank at the Bundesbank. In the 
process, the Banque de France incurs an obligation to the Bundesbank, 
and it will  be recorded, Flood and Garber tell us, “by incrementing the 
Bundesbank’s  bilateral  correspondent  . . . account  at  the  Banque  de 
France and reducing the Banque de France’s correspondent account at 
the Bundesbank by the same amount.” 
But that cannot be right. It involves double counting. When the Banque 
de France credits the Bundesbank’s correspondent account, the Bundes- 
bank acquires a claim on the Banque de France, which should appear 
automatically on the books of the Bundesbank. When the Bundesbank 
debits the correspondent account of the Banque de France, the Bundes- 
bank discharges a debt to the Banque de France, which should appear 
automatically  on the books of the Banque de France. If  both pairs of 
entries are made, then, the Bundesbank’s net position vis-a-vis the Banque 
de France will  change by  twice the amount of the transfer between the 
French and German banks.’ 
The example provided by the EM1 and borrowed by Flood and Garber 
would be  quite right if  TARGET were constructed differently-if  each 
national central bank were to hold a single clearing account with the ECB. 
The transfer between the French and German banks would then be re- 
1. In table 5.1 the entry “-100  Due to Banque de France” on the liability side of the 
Bundesbank‘s balance  sheet should  appear  instead  on the  asset side as “100  Due from 
Banque de France.” Is Launching the Euro Unstable in the Endgame?  179 
corded by debiting the clearing account of the Banque de France and cred- 
iting the clearing account of  the Bundesbank.* But the national central 
banks rejected this simple, sensible scheme because they sought to mini- 
mize the operational responsibilities of the ECB. 
How are Flood and Garber unkind to Obstfeld? In the final section of 
their paper, they take issue with Obstfeld’s finding that the variance of 
spot exchange rates will  rise as the start of EMU approaches (Obstfeld 
1997). They ascribe his result to his use of a model in which central banks 
target monetary aggregates rather than interest rates, and they go on to 
show that interest rate targeting can smooth the transition to EMU. They 
are quite right  to say  that  the day-to-day conduct  of  monetary policy 
should be modeled as interest rate targeting, not money supply targeting, 
even for central banks that claim to adhere to a money supply target. But 
the difference in the modeling of monetary policy is not why  exchange 
rates behave differently in the Obstfeld and Flood-Garber papers. 
In Obstfeld’s model, the variance of exchange rates rises because ex- 
change rates float freely; central banks do not try to influence them by 
manipulating the nonstochastic component of the “fundamental” (i.e., the 
ratio of  the monetary aggregates). In the Flood-Garber model, by  con- 
trast, there is a smooth transition to EMU because the central banks de- 
liberately manipulate interest rates in order to regulate exchange rate be- 
havior (i.e., they set 6 = A = 0 on the eve of EMU). 
Returning to the larger questions posed at the start of these comments, 
let us see why Flood and Garber feel the need to explain how the existence 
of TARGET will  solve the so-called endgame problem. Is there, in fact, 
a problem? 
It arises, they say, because some central banks might refuse to intervene 
just before the beginning of EMU. Suppose, for example, that holders of 
French francs started to sell them for deutsche marks on the eve of EMU. 
The franc would depreciate vis-a-vis the mark, jeopardizing adherence to 
the requirements of the Maastricht treaty. Under an ordinary pegged rate 
regime, the Banque de France might not be  able to keep the franc from 
depreciating because its reserves are too small. Under  ERM arrange- 
ments, the Banque de France could borrow marks from the Bundesbank, 
but it would have to repay them, and it might not want to incur that sort 
of debt to the Bundesbank. But the Bundesbank can buy francs freely to 
stabilize the franc-mark rate because it can print unlimited quantities of 
marks. And if it is willing to do that, there can be no endgame problem. 
But what if  the Bundesbank declines to intervene because it is  “luke- 
warm” about EMU? That is where TARGET comes to the rescue. Spot 
2. As Flood and Garber note, that is how imbalances are cleared within the Federal Re- 
serve system (but they are cleared at the end of each day, in a single net settlement, not on 
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transactions in the foreign exchange market are settled with a two-day lag. 
Transactions undertaken on the last day before EMU will be settled two 
days later, after EMU has started and TARGET is up and running. Hence, 
the Banque de France-or  any other central bank-can  intervene on the 
scale required to keep the franc from depreciating. It can sell marks to the 
speculators and use TARGET to pay for them two days later. It will credit 
the euro-denominated interlinking account held by the Bundesbank at the 
Banque de France and instruct the Bundesbank to complete the transac- 
tion by crediting the euro-denominated accounts that German banks hold 
at the Bundesbank. The German banks will then credit the mark-denom- 
inated accounts of the speculators who bought marks from the Banque de 
France. In effect, the Bundesbank will automatically extend euro-denom- 
inated  credit  to the  Banque  de France  in  the amount  needed  for the 
Banque de France to defend the franc-mark exchange rate, and the credit 
need not be repaid.3 
But is it realistic to assume that  Bundesbank  would  try  to sabotage 
EMU by refusing to defend the franc on the eve of EMU? If the Bundes- 
bank is lukewarm about EMU, it will make its doubts known openly and 
earlier. It will  not try to subvert EMU at the last minute. In short, the 
endgame problem is a nonproblem, and it does not need to be solved- 
not by using TARGET, as proposed by Flood and Garber, nor by  using 
forward transactions, as proposed by Obstfeld (1997). 
Nevertheless, Flood and Garber raise an important problem that has 
received little attention. The long-run viability of EMU will depend cru- 
cially on the willingness of the national central banks to build  up big 
claims on their partners-claims  that need not be repaid. That is what 
happened in my example, where the Bundesbank built up large claims on 
the Banque de France. It will also happen after EMU starts if holders of 
one country’s currency fear that the country will defect from EMU and 
allow its currency to depreciate. It could even happen after the euro re- 
places the national currencies; holders of euro-denominated deposits at 
one country’s banks would shift them to other countries’ banks if the first 
country was expected to defe~t.~  It could also happen if no country was 
3. In the example given by  Flood and Garber, the credit is  repaid, because the speculative 
attack takes a different form-short  sales of francs for marks. In that case, the speculators 
must acquire the francs they have already sold to the Banque de France, and they do that by 
converting their newly acquired marks back into francs. German banks then use TARGET to 
effect the conversion; they instruct the Bundesbank to credit the interlinking account of the 
Banque de France, which credits the euro-denominated accounts of French banks held with 
the Banque de France and instructs the French banks to credit the franc-denominated ac- 
counts of the speculators, giving them the francs they need to settle their foreign exchange 
transactions with the Banque de France. In the process, the Banque de France extends credit 
automatically to the Bundesbank and thus offsets its debt to the Bundesbank. I have used a 
different example, in which the speculators liquidate long positions in francs, to emphasize 
the open-ended nature of the credit lines available through TARGET. 
4. Garber (1998) examines these possibilities. Is Launching the Euro Unstable in the Endgame?  181 
expected to defect but one country ran a large, persistent current account 
deficit with a partner country and the deficit was not offset by  private 
capital flows. 
To the best of my knowledge, the EM1 has not discussed this issue, not 
in its reports on TARGET nor in those on the conduct of monetary policy. 
Whenever I have raised the problem, moreover, I have encountered a cer- 
tain ambivalence. Central bankers agree that the viability of EMU will 
depend on the willingness of the national central banks to build up unlim- 
ited claims on their partners. But some of them were clearly uncomfortable 
with that possibility. When I wrote my  first monograph on EMU (Kenen 
1992), I drew attention to the problem. Readers of the manuscript did not 
disagree with my warning that EMU could break down unless the national 
central banks were utterly indifferent to the size of their claims on their 
partners. But some of them wondered whether the Bundesbank would be 
indifferent to the size of its claims on the Banca d’Italia, and one of them 
distributed  a paper recently arguing that EMU is more likely to break 
down if the ECB does not impose limits on the size of the claims that the 
national central banks as a group are obliged to accumulate on any single 
central bank or, more generally, on any euro-area country. He does not 
tell us, however, how “excess” claims should be paid down. 
The treatment of imbalances within TARGET may be the most impor- 
tant piece of unfinished business for the ECB to tackle when, on 1 July 
1998, it starts to adopt the formal rules under which it will operate. 
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